Contractualism, personal values, and well-being

Social Philosophy and Policy 30 (1-2):51-68 (2013)

Abstract

Scanlon's distinction between well-being and other personal values cannot be made out clearly if well-being is understood, as it commonly is, to consist in whatever is intrinsically good for a person. Two other accounts of well-being, however, might be able to explain this distinction. One is a version of the rational care view proposed by Stephen Darwall; another is a rational sympathy view suggested by some of Brad Hooker's work

Download options

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 72,694

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2014-02-16

Downloads
39 (#295,178)

6 months
1 (#388,311)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Peter de Marneffe
Arizona State University

References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Normative Ethics.Shelly Kagan - 1998 - Mind 109 (434):373-377.
The Limits of Well-Being.Shelly Kagan - 1992 - Social Philosophy and Policy 9 (2):169-189.
Does Moral Virtue Constitute a Benefit to the Agent?Brad Hooker - 1996 - In Roger Crisp (ed.), How Should one Live? Oxford University Press.

View all 10 references / Add more references

Similar books and articles

Common and Personal Values in Moral Education.David Carr - 1998 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 17 (4):303-312.
What We Owe to Many.Jussi Suikkanen - 2004 - Social Theory and Practice 30 (4):485-506.
Nurses' Professional and Personal Values.Michal Rassin - 2008 - Nursing Ethics 15 (5):614-630.
A Deliberative Model of Contractualism.Nicholas Southwood - 2008 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 7 (2):183-208.