Itay Shani
Sun Yat Sen University, Zhuhai Campus
Liam P. Dempsey
Kwantlen Polytechnic University
The aim of this paper is to defend the causal efficacy of consciousness against two specters of epiphenomenalism. We argue that these challenges are best met, on the one hand, by rejecting all forms of consciousness-body dualism, and on the other, by adopting a dynamical systems approach to understanding the causal efficacy of conscious experience. We argue that this non-reductive identity theory provides the theoretical resources for reconciling the reality and efficacy of consciousness with the neurophysiology of the brain and body.
Keywords Autonomy  Consciousness  Downward causation  Epiphenomenalism  Non-reductive identity  Self-organization  The ontological argument for consciousness epiphenomenalism  The out of-the-loop argument for consciousness epiphenomenalism
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-008-9112-4
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References found in this work BETA

The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - Dover Publications.
Epiphenomenal Qualia.Frank Jackson - 1982 - Philosophical Quarterly 32 (April):127-136.
Physicalism, or Something Near Enough.Jaegwon Kim - 2005 - Princeton University Press.

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Three Misconceptions Concerning Strong Embodiment.Liam P. Dempsey & Itay Shani - 2015 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 14 (4):827-849.

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