Philosophical Psychology 29 (1):1-22 (2016)

Authors
Joanna Demaree-Cotton
Oxford University
Abstract
I address Sinnott-Armstrong's argument that evidence of framing effects in moral psychology shows that moral intuitions are unreliable and therefore not noninferentially justified. I begin by discussing what it is to be epistemically unreliable and clarify how framing effects render moral intuitions unreliable. This analysis calls for a modification of Sinnott-Armstrong's argument if it is to remain valid. In particular, he must claim that framing is sufficiently likely to determine the content of moral intuitions. I then re-examine the evidence which is supposed to support this claim. In doing so, I provide a novel suggestion for how to analyze the reliability of intuitions in empirical studies. Analysis of the evidence suggests that moral intuitions subject to framing effects are in fact much more reliable than perhaps was thought, and that Sinnott-Armstrong has not succeeded in showing that noninferential justification has been defeated.
Keywords intuitions  moral psychology  framing effects  reliability  intuitionism  order effects  ethics  moral epistemology  justification
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2016
DOI 10.1080/09515089.2014.989967
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Epistemology and Cognition.Alvin Ira Goldman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: Harvard University Press.
Moral Realism: A Defence.Russ Shafer-Landau - 2003 - Oxford University Press.
Change in View: Principles of Reasoning.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Cambridge, MA, USA: MIT Press.
Change in View.Gilbert Harman - 1986 - Behaviorism 16 (1):93-96.

View all 34 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Philosophy Within its Proper Bounds.Edouard Machery - 2017 - Oxford University Press.
Regard for Reason in the Moral Mind.Joshua May - 2018 - Oxford University Press.
Debunking Arguments in Ethics.Hanno Sauer - 2018 - Cambridge University Press.
How to Debunk Moral Beliefs.Victor Kumar & Joshua May - 2019 - In Jussi Suikkanen & Antti Kauppinen (eds.), Methodology and Moral Philosophy. Routledge. pp. 25-48.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Moral Intuitions.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, Liane Young & Fiery Cushman - 2010 - In John Michael Doris (ed.), The Moral Psychology Handbook. Oxford University Press. pp. 246--272.
Bioconservatism, Bioliberalism, and Repugnance.Rebecca Roache & Steve Clarke - 2009 - Monash Bioethics Review 28 (1):04.1-04.21.
A Defense of Intuitions.S. Matthew Liao - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (2):247 - 262.
Moral Intuitionism, Experiments and Skeptical Arguments.Mark van Roojen - 2014 - In Anthony Booth & Darrell Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press.
What Good Are Counterexamples?Brian Weatherson - 2003 - Philosophical Studies 115 (1):1-31.
Consent and the Problem of Framing Effects.Jason Hanna - 2011 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 14 (5):517-531.
The Epistemic Value of Intuitive Moral Judgements.Albert W. Musschenga - 2010 - Philosophical Explorations 13 (2):113-128.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2014-12-14

Total views
865 ( #7,643 of 2,497,779 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
53 ( #15,408 of 2,497,779 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes