Authors
Heather Demarest
University of Colorado, Boulder
Abstract
If a person, A, branches into B and C, then it is widely held that B and C are not identical to one another. Many think that this is because B and C have contradictory properties at the same time. In this paper, I show why this explanation cannot be right. I argue that contradictory properties at times are not necessary for non-identity between descendants, and that contradictory properties at times are not sufficient for non-identity. I also argue that the standard explanation cannot be salvaged by a shift to personal time. Appeals to a lack of continuity, or to the absence of unity of consciousness likewise fail. Rather, B and C are non-identical simply because A branched into B and C. Why branching should be problematic for personal identity remains a deep puzzle though I offer some tentative suggestions.
Keywords Personal Identity  Fission  Time Travel  Identity
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DOI 10.1111/phpr.12192
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
Sameness and Substance.David Wiggins - 1980 - Harvard University Press.
The Constitution of Selves.Marya Schechtman (ed.) - 1996 - Cornell University Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Nowhere Man: Time Travel and Spatial Location.Sara Bernstein - 2015 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 39 (1):158-168.
Non-Branching Personal Persistence.Johan E. Gustafsson - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (9):2307-2329.
Against Branching Identity.William Bauer - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (4):1709-1719.

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