Is Moral Responsibility Essentially Interpersonal? A Reply to Zimmerman

The Journal of Ethics 21 (3):309-333 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

According to Michael Zimmerman, no interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal captures a significant truth. He raises several worries about the Strawsonian view that moral responsibility consists in susceptibility to the reactive attitudes and claims that this view at best supports only an etiolated interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal. He outlines three problems. First, the existence of self-reactive attitudes may be incompatible with the interpersonal nature of moral responsibility. Secondly, Zimmerman questions the significance of the interpersonal nature of moral responsibility, according to the Strawsonian view. Thirdly, he argues that that view may be taken to suggest the wrong kind of priority relation between ‘P is morally responsible’ and ‘it is appropriate to adopt some reactive attitude toward P’. I discuss each of these problems in turn and conclude that Strawsonians can respond to all three problems raised by Zimmerman. The Strawsonian view supports a significant interpretation of the idea that moral responsibility is essentially interpersonal.

Similar books and articles

Conversation and Responsibility.Michael McKenna - 2011 - Oxford University Press USA.
Causation and Responsibility.Carolina Sartorio - 2007 - Philosophy Compass 2 (5):749–765.
Verantwortung und Sanktion.Andras Szigeti - 2013 - In Buddeberg Eva & Vesper Achim (eds.), Moral und Sanktion. Campus.
Responsibility, Moral and Otherwise.Susan Wolf - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):127-142.

Analytics

Added to PP
2017-03-09

Downloads
158 (#78,199)

6 months
46 (#20,875)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile