Stressing the Flesh: In Defense of Strong Embodied Cognition


Authors
Itay Shani
Sun Yat Sen University, Zhuhai Campus
Abstract
In a recent paper, Andy Clark (2008) has argued that the literature on embodied cognition reveals a tension between two prominent strands within this movement. On the one hand, there are those who endorse what Clark refers to as body-centrism, a view which emphasizes the special contribution made by the body to a creature’s mental life. Among other things, body centrism implies that significant differences in embodiment translate into significant differences in cognition and consciousness. On the other hand, there are those who endorse what Clark calls extended functionalism, a view which sees the mind as the joint product of the computational resources presented by (i) intracranial processing, (ii) bodily input, and (iii) environmental scaffolding. As such, extended functionalism allows for the possibility that any contribution of the body to cognition and consciousness can be compensated for by the other two contributing factors. While Clark’s sympathies lie with the latter approach, we argue in favour of the former. In particular, we focus on consciousness and argue that the unique contribution the body makes to a creature’s manifold of phenomenal experience cannot be compensated for, in the manner, and on the scale, that Clark envisages
Keywords Analytic Philosophy  Contemporary Philosophy  Philosophy of Mind
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ISBN(s) 0031-8205
DOI 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2011.00553.x
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References found in this work BETA

Action in Perception.Alva Noë - 2005 - MIT Press.
Metaphors We Live By.George Lakoff - 1980 - University of Chicago Press.

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Citations of this work BETA

Can the Mind Be Embodied, Enactive, Affective, and Extended?Michelle Maiese - 2018 - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 17 (2):343-361.
Embodying the Mind by Extending It.Pierre Jacob - 2012 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 3 (1):33-51.

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