Abstract
Many of our large-scale problems that arise only recently in human history and in an industrialized global world present us with a unique challenge. Often while people collectively make a difference, individual actions are inconsequential. Consider climate change. We all collectively contribute to its unwanted consequences. But individual actions are inconsequential: One more or one less person taking a joyride in a gas-guzzler on a Sunday afternoon makes no difference regarding these consequences. Donating to charity, voting, buying fair trade products, factory farming, and environmental pollution all present the same challenge. One more or one less vote doesn’t make a difference. But then it’s unclear why individuals should act against climate change or vote. This is the so-called problem of inconsequentialism. In this paper, I present a new solution to this problem by appealing to a type of action that is yet to receive philosophical attention—i.e., taking a stand. I show that taking a stand can be morally valuable and reason-giving even if it makes no difference. (NOTE: Email me for a copy.)