Three misconceptions concerning strong embodiment

Authors
Itay Shani
Sun Yat Sen University, Zhuhai Campus
Abstract
The strong embodied mind thesis holds that the particular details of one’s embodiment shape the phenomenological and cognitive nature of one’s mind. On the face of it, this is an attractive thesis. Yet strong embodiment faces a number of challenges. In particular, there are three prominent misconceptions about the scope and nature of strong embodiment: 1) that it violates the supposed multiple realizability of mentality; 2) that it cannot accommodate mental representation; and 3) that it is inconsistent with the extended mind thesis according to which mentality extends, not only beyond brain, but beyond body as well. In this paper, we seek to dispel these three misconceptions by explaining what strong embodiment does and does not entail
Keywords Strong embodiment  Embodied cognition  Platform neutrality  Multiple realizability  Extended mind thesis  Functionalism  Consciousness  Mental representation  Social cognition
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-014-9360-4
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References found in this work BETA

How the Body Shapes the Mind.Shaun Gallagher - 2005 - Oxford University Press UK.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Extended Mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.

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