Philosophy of Science 83 (4):500-520 (2016)

Authors
Inmaculada de Melo-Martin
Weill Cornell Medicine--Cornell University
Abstract
The argument from inductive risk has been embraced by many as a successful account of the role of values in science that challenges the value-free ideal. We argue that it is not obvious that the argument from inductive risk actually undermines the value-free ideal. This is because the inductive risk argument endorses an assumption held by proponents of the value-free ideal: that contextual values never play an appropriate role in determining evidence. We show that challenging the value-free ideal ultimately requires rejecting this assumption.
Keywords inductive risk  value-free
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DOI 10.1086/687259
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Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science.Uwe Peters - forthcoming - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science:axy079.
On Value-Laden Science.Zina B. Ward - 2021 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 85:54-62.
Values and Evidence: How Models Make a Difference.Wendy S. Parker & Eric Winsberg - 2018 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 8 (1):125-142.

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