Philosophical Explorations 7 (1):21-35 (2004)
In this paper I distinguish two types of mental causation, called 'higher-level causation' and 'exploitation'. These notions superficially resemble the traditional problematic notions of supervenient causation and downward causation, but they are different in crucial respects. My new distinction is supported by a radically externalist competitor of the so-called Standard View of mental states, i.e. the view that mental states are brain states. I argue that on the Alternative View, the notions of 'higher-level causation' and 'exploitation' can in combination dissolve the problem of mental causation as standardly discussed.
|Keywords||Exploitation Mental Causation Mental States Metaphysics Supervenience|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
Being There: Putting Brain, Body, and World Together Again.Andy Clark - 1997 - MIT Press.
Language, Thought and Other Biological Categories.Ruth G. Millikan - 1984 - MIT Press.
Elbow Room: The Varieties of Free Will Worth Wanting.Daniel C. Dennett - 1984 - MIT Press.
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