Debunking conspiracy theories

Synthese 198 (10):9897-9911 (2020)
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Abstract

In this paper I interrogate the notion of `debunking conspiracy theories’, arguing that the term `debunk’ carries with it pejorative implications, given that the verb `to debunk’ is commonly understood as `to show the wrongness of a thing or concept’. As such, the notion of `debunking conspiracy theories’ builds in the notion that such theories are not just wrong but ought to be shown as being wrong. I argue that we should avoid the term `debunk’ and focus on investigating conspiracy theories. Looking at recent research work in epistemology on conspiracy theory, I argue that the best way to avoid talk of `debunking’ conspiracy theories is by working with a non-pejorative definition of `conspiracy theory’, and forming communities of inquiry which allow us to investigate the warrant of such theories without the prejudice associated with working with a pejorative definition.

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M R. X. Dentith
Beijing Normal University

References found in this work

Vice Epistemology.Quassim Cassam - 2016 - The Monist 99 (2):159-180.
The Open Society and its Enemies.Karl R. Popper - 1952 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 142:629-634.
Logic: The Theory of Inquiry.John Dewey - 1938 - Philosophy 14 (55):370-371.
The Open Society and Its Enemies.K. R. Popper - 1946 - Philosophy 21 (80):271-276.

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