In Antti Revonsuo & Matti Kamppinen (eds.), Consciousness in Philosophy and Cognitive Neuroscience. Lawrence Erlbaum (1994)
Philosophers have adopted various names for the things in the beholder that have been supposed to provide a safe home for the colors and the rest of the properties that have been banished from the "external" world by the triumphs of physics: "raw feels", "sensa", "phenomenal qualities" "intrinsic properties of conscious experiences" "the qualitative content of mental states" and, of course, " qualia," the term I will use. There are subtle differences in how these terms have been defined, but I'm going to ride roughshod over them. I deny that there are
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
The Scrambling Theorem: A Simple Proof of the Logical Possibility of Spectrum Inversion.Donald D. Hoffman - 2006 - Consciousness and Cognition 15 (1):31-45.
Qualia and the Argument From Illusion: A Defence of Figment. [REVIEW]Andrew R. Bailey - 2007 - Acta Analytica 22 (2):85-103.
Similar books and articles
The Qualities of Qualia.David de Leon - 2001 - Communication and Cognition: An Interdisciplinary Quarterly Journal 34 (1):121-138.
Qualia and the Psychophysical Explanation of Color Perception.Austen Clark - 1985 - Synthese 65 (December):377-405.
Quining Qualia.Daniel C. Dennett - 1988 - In Anthony J. Marcel & E. Bisiach (eds.), [Book Chapter]. Oxford University Press.
Capturing Qualia: Higher-Order Concepts and Connectionism.Bryon Cunningham - 2001 - Philosophical Psychology 14 (1):29-41.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads168 ( #26,891 of 2,158,890 )
Recent downloads (6 months)8 ( #41,213 of 2,158,890 )
How can I increase my downloads?