Ratio Juris 25 (2):149-179 (2012)
This paper investigates the relations between the concepts of moral harm and moral responsibility, arguing for a circularity between the two. On this basis the conceptual soundness of descriptivism, on which consequentialist and non-consequentialist arguments are often grounded, is questioned. In the last section a certain version of ascriptivism is defended: The circularity is relevant in order to understand how a restricted version of ascriptivism may in fact be well founded
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Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers, 1973-1980.Bernard Arthur Owen Williams - 1981 - Cambridge University Press.
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