Real patterns

Journal of Philosophy 88 (1):27-51 (1991)

Authors
Daniel C. Dennett
Tufts University
Abstract
Are there really beliefs? Or are we learning (from neuroscience and psychology, presumably) that, strictly speaking, beliefs are figments of our imagination, items in a superceded ontology? Philosophers generally regard such ontological questions as admitting just two possible answers: either beliefs exist or they don't. There is no such state as quasi-existence; there are no stable doctrines of semi-realism. Beliefs must either be vindicated along with the viruses or banished along with the banshees. A bracing conviction prevails, then, to the effect that when it comes to beliefs (and other mental items) one must be either a realist or an eliminative materialist
Keywords Belief  Metaphysics  Pattern  Realism
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DOI 10.2307/2027085
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References found in this work BETA

What is Present to the Mind?Donald Davidson - 1989 - In Grazer Philosophische Studien. Netherlands: Rodopi. pp. 197-213.
Patterns.Norton Nelkin - 1994 - Mind and Language 9 (1):56-87.

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