Abstract
The traditional conception of risk is probabilistic, according to which the degree of risk of an event is determined by the probability of its occurence. Recently this view was challenged by Duncan Pritchard (2015, 2016), who suggested a modal theory of risk, centered in the idea that the riskiness of events depends on the modal distance between the actual world and worlds where the event obtains. What is attractive about this theory, according to Pritchard, is that it explains our judgement about cases in which two equally probable events seem to have different degrees of risk. The modal theory of risk, however, has its own shortcomings: according to Bricker (2018), there are cases in which risk judgements are not tracking modal distance; there is also the problem of determining the risk of events that occur in the actual world, since the theory seems to imply that they are maximally risky because the actual world is maximally similar to itself (EBERT; SMITH; DURBACH, 2020). The modal conception of risk is also at odds with the most natural forms of reasoning over the morality of risk imposition. I begin exploring the two conceptions of risk, emphasizing their strenghts and weaknesses. I then argue that the probabilistic conception can be defended from objections, and a pluralistic theory of risk, although less unified, deserves to be considered.