Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):37-64 (2004)
In this paper I argue against the received view that the anti-nativist arguments of Book I of Locke’s Essay conclusively challenge nativism. I begin by reconstructing the chief argument of Book I and its corollary arguments. I call attention to their dependence on (what I label) “the Awareness Principle”, viz., the view that there are no ideas in the mind of which the mind either isn’t currently aware or hasn’t been aware in the past. I then argue that the arguments’ dependence on this principle is question begging on two counts. Unless this principle is defended, Locke’s arguments beg the question against Descartes and Leibniz because their nativism implies the denial of the Awareness Principle. And even when Locke defended the principle, his arguments remain question begging because they presuppose the empiricism they aim to prove. The disclosure of the question-begging status of these arguments debunks a seemingly powerful way of attacking nativism
|Keywords||Empiricism Metaphysics Nativism Question Begging Locke|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Skepticism, Question Begging, and Burden Shifting.Paul K. Moser - 2000 - The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:209-217.
Running in Circles About Begging the Question.D. A. Truncellito - 2004 - Argumentation 18 (3):325-329.
Question-Begging Under a Non-Foundational Model of Argument.Peter Suber - 1994 - Argumentation 8 (3):241-250.
Begging the Question and Bayesians.Brian Weatherson - 1999 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 30:687-697.
Petitio Principii: What's Wrong?Andrea Iacona & Diego Marconi - 2005 - Facta Philosophica 7 (1):19-34.
Begging the Question.Walter Sinnott-Armstrong - 1999 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 77 (2):174 – 191.
Locke's "Essay, Book I": The Question-Begging Status of the Anti-Nativist Arguments.Raffaella Rosa - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (1):37 - 64.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads74 ( #71,231 of 2,171,683 )
Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #173,816 of 2,171,683 )
How can I increase my downloads?