On the Harsanyi payoff vectors and Harsanyi imputations

Theory and Decision 68 (3):301-310 (2010)
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This article discusses the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors of a cooperative TU-game, also known as the Selectope. We reconsider some results on Harsanyi payoff vectors within a more general framework. First, an intuitive approach is used, showing that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is the core of an associated convex game. Next, the set of individual rational Harsanyi payoff vectors, the Harsanyi imputations in short, is considered. Existence conditions are provided, and if non-empty, we provide a description as the core of a well-defined convex game, and show that it is an externally stable set



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Theory of Games and Economic Behavior.John Von Neumann & Oskar Morgenstern - 1944 - Princeton, NJ, USA: Princeton University Press.
Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. [REVIEW]E. N. - 1945 - Journal of Philosophy 42 (20):550-554.

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