The ordinary language basis for contextualism, and the new invariantism

Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):172–198 (2005)
Abstract
I present the features of the ordinary use of 'knows' that make a compelling case for the contextualist account of that verb, and I outline and defend the methodology that takes us from the data to a contextualist conclusion. Along the way, the superiority of contextualism over subject-sensitive invariantism is defended, and, in the final section, I answer some objections to contextualism.
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DOI 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2005.00394.x
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References found in this work BETA
Contextualism, Skepticism, and the Structure of Reasons.Stewart Cohen - 1999 - Philosophical Perspectives 13 (s13):57-89.
Causation as Influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.

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Citations of this work BETA
The Rise and Fall of Experimental Philosophy.Antti Kauppinen - 2007 - Philosophical Explorations 10 (2):95 – 118.
Contextualism, Contrastivism, and X-Phi Surveys.Keith DeRose - 2011 - Philosophical Studies 156 (1):81-110.
Knowledge Isn't Closed on Saturday: A Study in Ordinary Language.Wesley Buckwalter - 2010 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (3):395-406.
Knowledge Ascriptions and the Psychological Consequences of Changing Stakes.Jennifer Nagel - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (2):279-294.

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