The verdictive organization of desire

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 47 (5):589-612 (2017)
Authors
Derek Baker
Lingnan University
Abstract
Deliberation often begins with the question ‘What do I want to do?’ rather than the question of what one ought to do. This paper takes that question at face value, as a question about which of one’s desires is strongest, which sometimes guides action. The paper aims to explain which properties of a desire make that desire strong, in the sense of ‘strength’ relevant to this deliberative question. Both motivational force and phenomenological intensity seem relevant to a desire’s strength; however, accounting for the strength of a desire in these terms opens up significant indeterminacy about what we want. The paper argues that this indeterminacy is often resolved simply by posing the question ‘What do I want to do?’ to oneself: there is reason to believe that one’s answer will play a verdictive role, partially determining what the agent most wants. Self-reflective beliefs can play a self-fulfilling role, and surprisingly this seems to follow from basic platitudes about the belief-desire model.
Keywords Desires  Practical Reason  Practical Rationality  Self-Knowledge  Humean Theory of Reasons
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00455091.2016.1278149
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

No references found.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Humean Theory of Practical Irrationality.Neil Sinhababu - 2011 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 6 (1):1-13.
Practical Reasons and Internalism.Hans Vilhelm Hansen - 1990 - Dissertation, Wayne State University
The Authority of Desire.Dennis W. Stampe - 1987 - Philosophical Review 96 (July):335-81.
On Desires and Practical Reasons.John J. Tilley - 2004 - Acta Analytica 19 (32):5-18.
Desires, Reasons, and Causes. [REVIEW]Stephen Darwall - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 67 (2):436–443.
The Abductive Case for Humeanism Over Quasi-Perceptual Theories of Desire.Derek Baker - 2014 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 8 (2):1-29.
Reason Internalism.Alan H. Goldman - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (3):505 - 533.
Realism, Rational Action, and the Humean Theory of Motivation.Melissa Barry - 2007 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 10 (3):231-242.
Phenomenal Desire and its Role in Practical Reason.Jennifer Elisabeth Johnson - 2003 - Dissertation, University of California, Berkeley
Desire-Based Theories of Reasons, Pleasure, and Welfare.Chris Heathwood - 2011 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 6:79-106.
Defending Desire: Scanlon’s Anti-Humeanism.Steven Arkonovich - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3):499-519.
Desires, Reasons, and Rationality.Joshua Gert - 2009 - American Philosophical Quarterly 46 (4):319 - 332.
The Openness of Attitudes and Action in Ambivalence.Hili Razinsky - 2015 - South African Journal of Philosophy 34 (1):79-92.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-12-12

Total downloads
82 ( #79,867 of 2,296,138 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
12 ( #40,442 of 2,296,138 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature