Why do experts disagree? The development of a taxonomy

Public Understanding of Science 32 (2):224 - 246 (2023)
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Abstract

People are increasingly exposed to conflicting health information and must navigate this information to make numerous decisions, such as which foods to consume, a process many find difficult. Although some consumers attribute these disagreements to aspects related to uncertainty and complexity of research, many use a narrower set of credibility-based explanations. Experts’ views on disagreements are underinvestigated and lack explicit identification and classification of the differences in causes for disagreement. Consequently, there is a gap in existing literature to understand the range of reasons for these contradictions. Combining the findings from a literature study and expert interviews, a taxonomy of disagreements was developed. It identifies 10 types of disagreement classified under three dimensions: informant-, information- and uncertainty-related causes for disagreement. The taxonomy may assist with adoption of more effective strategies to deal with conflicting information and contributes to research and practice of science communication in the context of disagreement.

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Simon Knight
University of Technology Sydney

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