Incentivizing Replication Is Insufficient to Safeguard Default Trust

Philosophy of Science 88 (5):906-917 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Philosophers of science and metascientists alike typically model scientists’ behavior as driven by credit maximization. In this article I argue that this modeling assumption cannot account for how scientists have a default level of trust in each other’s assertions. The normative implication of this is that science policy should not focus solely on incentive reform.

Similar books and articles

Democratic Values: A Better Foundation for Public Trust in Science.S. Andrew Schroeder - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (2):545-562.
Scientific Research and the Public Trust.David B. Resnik - 2011 - Science and Engineering Ethics 17 (3):399-409.
Moral trust & scientific collaboration.Karen Frost-Arnold - 2013 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (3):301-310.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-09-27

Downloads
316 (#67,405)

6 months
107 (#45,461)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Hugh Desmond
Leibniz Universität Hannover

Citations of this work

Status Distrust of Scientific Experts.Hugh Desmond - 2022 - Social Epistemology 36 (5):586-600.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Knowledge and its limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophy 76 (297):460-464.
Knowledge and its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 64 (1):200-201.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):105-116.
Knowledge and Its Limits.Timothy Williamson - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2):452-458.

View all 20 references / Add more references