Synthese 191 (6):1105-1117 (2014)
Consider a cat on a mat. On the one hand, there seems to be just one cat, but on the other there seem to be many things with as good a claim as anything in the vicinity to being a cat. Hence, the problem of the many. In his ‘Many, but Almost One,’ David Lewis offered two solutions. According to the first, only one of the many is indeed a cat, although it is indeterminate exactly which one. According to the second, the many are all cats, but they are almost identical to each other, and hence they are almost one. For Lewis, the two solutions do not compete with each other but are mutually complementary, as each one can assist the other. This paper has two aims: to give some reasons against the first of these two solutions, but then to defend the second as a self-standing solution from Lewis’s considerations to the contrary.
|Keywords||Problem of the many Vagueness Supervaluationism Lewis|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Maximality and Intrinsic Properties.Theodore Sider - 2001 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):357 - 364.
Maximality and Microphysical Supervenience.Theodore Sider - 2003 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 66 (1):139-149.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Lewis on Fallible Knowledge.Igor Douven - 2005 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 83 (4):573 – 580.
As Good as It Gets: Lewis on Truth in Fiction.Richard Hanley - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (1):112 – 128.
A Defense of Local Miracle Compatibilism.Peter A. Graham - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 140 (1):65 - 82.
Why You Don’T Want to Get in the Box with Schrödinger's Cat.David Papineau - 2003 - Analysis 63 (277):51–58.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads123 ( #39,608 of 2,171,877 )
Recent downloads (6 months)4 ( #76,305 of 2,171,877 )
How can I increase my downloads?