Moral emotions

Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109-126 (2001)
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Abstract

Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multidimensional and relative to human realities. The axiological position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony.

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Author Profiles

Ronald De Sousa
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Ronnie de Sousa
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

References found in this work

Utilitarianism.J. S. Mill - 1861 - Oxford University Press UK. Edited by Roger Crisp.
Treatise of Human Nature.L. A. Selby-Bigge (ed.) - 1978 - Oxford University Press.
Ethnographic atlas.George Peter Murdock - 1967 - [Pittsburgh]: University of Pittsburgh Press.

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