Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 4 (2):109-126 (2001)
Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multidimensional and relative to human realities. The axiological position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony.
|Keywords||axiology emotions ethical naturalism foundations of ethics sentimentalism|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
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Citations of this work BETA
Weak Motivational Internalism, Lite: Dispositions, Moral Judgments, and What We're Motivated to Do.Jesse Steinberg - 2009 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 39 (sup1):1-24.
Psychopaths and Filthy Desks: Are Emotions Necessary and Sufficient for Moral Judgment?Hanno Sauer - 2012 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 15 (1):95-115.
Emotion Education Without Ontological Commitment?Kristján Kristjánsson - 2010 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 29 (3):259-274.
Educating Moral Emotions: A Praxiological Analysis. [REVIEW]Bruce Maxwell & Roland Reichenbach - 2007 - Studies in Philosophy and Education 26 (2):147-163.
Introduction: Moral Emotions.Florian Cova, Julien Deonna & David Sander - 2015 - Topoi 34 (2):397-400.
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