Service and Status Competition May Help Explain Perceived Ethical Acceptability

American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 11 (4):258-260 (2020)
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Abstract

The dominant view on the ethics of cognitive enhancement (CE) is that CE is beholden to the principle of autonomy. However, this principle does not seem to reflect commonly held ethical judgments about enhancement. Is the principle of autonomy at fault, or should common judgments be adjusted? Here I argue for the first, and show how common judgments can be justified as based on a principle of service.

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Hugh Desmond
Leibniz Universität Hannover

Citations of this work

Precision Medicine, Data, and the Anthropology of Social Status.Hugh Desmond - 2021 - American Journal of Bioethics 21 (4):80-83.
Reclaiming Care and Privacy in the Age of Social Media.Hugh Desmond - 2022 - Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement 92:45-66.
Personhood, Welfare, and Enhancement.Hugh Desmond - 2022 - American Journal of Bioethics 22 (9):37-39.

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