Who Should Enhance? Conceptual and Normative Dimensions of Cognitive Enhancement

Humana Mente 7 (26) (2014)
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Abstract

When should humans enhance themselves? We try to answer this question by engaging in a conceptual analysis of the nature of different activities. We think that cognitive enhancement is morally impermissible in some practice-oriented activities, such as some educational activities, when it is the case both that cognitive enhancement would negatively affect the point of those activities and that we have good reasons to value that point. We then argue that cognitive enhancement should be allowed in two groups of cases, namely in practice-oriented activities, such as recreational activities on which little moral value or social import hangs, and in some prominently goal-directed activities, such as high-responsibility professions, the goal of which has significant moral or social value. Finally, we argue that the use of efficacious and relatively safe cognitive enhancers may even be obligatory in those high-responsibility professions under certain special circumstances.

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Nicole A. Vincent
University of Technology Sydney

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References found in this work

After Virtue.A. MacIntyre - 1981 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 46 (1):169-171.
Two concepts of rules.John Rawls - 1955 - Philosophical Review 64 (1):3-32.
On the argument that enhancement is "cheating".M. Schermer - 2008 - Journal of Medical Ethics 34 (2):85-88.

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