Intentionalism and intransitivity

Synthese 144 (1):1-22 (2005)
Abstract
I argue in this paper that the existence of sorites series of color patches – series of color patches arranged so that the patches on each end look different in color though no two adjacent patches do – shows that the relation of same phenomenal charac­ter as is not a transitive relation. I then argue that the intransitivity of same phenomenal character as conflicts with certain versions of intentionalism, the view that an experiences phenomenal character is exhausted, or fully determined by its intentional content. Lastly, I consider various objections to the arguments and reply to them
Keywords Color  Consciousness  Intentionalism  Intransitive  Metaphysics  Phenomena  Sorites
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1007/s11229-005-1022-1
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
Edit this record
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Mark as duplicate
Request removal from index
Revision history
Download options
Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 31,812
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Purple Haze: The Puzzle of Consciousness.Joseph Levine - 2001 - Oxford University Press USA.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Intentionalism Defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.

View all 24 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Color-Consciousness Conceptualism.Pete Mandik - 2012 - Consciousness and Cognition 21 (2):617-631.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles
Phenomenal Colors and Sorites.C. L. Hardin - 1988 - Noûs 22 (2):213-34.
Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum.Michael Watkins - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):299-313.
Response-Intentionalism About Color: A Sketch.Nenad Miscevic - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):179-191.
Physicalism Plus Intentionalism Equals Error Theory.Daniel Stoljar - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):790-791.
Intentionalism and Pain.David Bain - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (213):502-523.
Consciousness and Self-Consciousness.Uriah Kriegel - 2004 - The Monist 87 (2):182-205.
Response-Intentionalism About Color.Nenad Miščević - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (2):179-191.
Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
117 ( #48,212 of 2,231,615 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
6 ( #98,722 of 2,231,615 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads
My notes
Sign in to use this feature