Synthese 144 (1):1-22 (2005)
AbstractI argue in this paper that the existence of sorites series of color patches – series of color patches arranged so that the patches on each end look different in color though no two adjacent patches do – shows that the relation of same phenomenal character as is not a transitive relation. I then argue that the intransitivity of same phenomenal character as conflicts with certain versions of intentionalism, the view that an experiences phenomenal character is exhausted, or fully determined by its intentional content. Lastly, I consider various objections to the arguments and reply to them
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
References found in this work
On a Confusion About a Function of Consciousness.Ned Block - 1995 - Brain and Behavioral Sciences 18 (2):227-–247.
Sense and Content: Experience, Thought and Their Relations.Christopher Peacocke - 1983 - Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work
Goff's Revelation Thesis and the Epistemology of Colour Discrimination.Gary Neels - forthcoming - Synthese.
Does the Phenomenality of Perceptual Experience Present an Obstacle to Phenomenal Externalism?Robert Schroer - 2009 - Philosophical Papers 38 (1):93-110.
The Way Ripe Tomatoes Look: An Argument Against Externalist Representationalism.Max Deutsch - 2012 - Erkenntnis 77 (3):297-316.
Similar books and articles
Intentionalism and the Inverted Spectrum.Michael Watkins - 2008 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 8 (3):299-313.
Response-Intentionalism About Color: A Sketch.Nenad Miščević - 2004 - Croatian Journal of Philosophy 4 (11):179-191.
Physicalism Plus Intentionalism Equals Error Theory.Daniel Stoljar - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (6):790-791.
Is Color-Dispositionalism Nasty and Unecological?Nenad Miscevic - 2007 - Erkenntnis 66 (1-2):203 - 231.
Phenomenal Sorites Paradoxes and Looking the Same.Rosanna Keefe - 2011 - Dialectica 65 (3):327-344.