Erkenntnis 77 (3):297-316 (2012)

Authors
Max Emil Deutsch
University of Hong Kong
Abstract
Representationalist theories of the phenomenal character of conscious experience are attractive because they promise a simpler 'naturalization' of the mind. However, I argue that representationalists cannot endorse an otherwise attractive externalist theory of the representational contents of conscious experiences. The combination of representationalism and externalism conflicts with a true principle linking phenomenal character to perceptual indistinguishability
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DOI 10.1007/s10670-012-9408-1
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References found in this work BETA

What is It Like to Be a Bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (October):435-50.
The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.Gilbert Harman - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:31-52.
Inverted Earth.Ned Block - 1990 - Philosophical Perspectives 4:53-79.

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Externalism About Mental Content.Joe Lau - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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