Analogues of knowability

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):481 – 495 (2003)
  Copy   BIBTEX


An interesting recent reply to the Paradox of Knowability is Neil Tennant's proposal: to restrict the anti-realist's knowability thesis to truths the knowing of which is logically consistent. However, this proposal is egregiously ad hoc unless motivated by something other than the wish to save anti-realism from embarrassment. We examine Tennant's argument that his restriction is motivated by parallel considerations in cases that are neutral with respect to debates about realism. We conclude that the cases are not neutral, nor the considerations parallel. The failure of Tennant's argument provides an opportunity to reflect on, among other things, the nature of Moore's paradox, and the role of idealization in doxastic logic.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 76,400

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles


Added to PP

59 (#203,042)

6 months
1 (#452,962)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Tim Kenyon
University of Waterloo
David DeVidi
University of Waterloo

References found in this work

The Taming of the True.Neil Tennant - 1997 - Oxford, England: Oxford University Press.
A logical analysis of some value concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
The Taming of the True.Michael Glanzberg & Neil Tennant - 2000 - Philosophical Review 109 (2):290.
Is every truth knowable? Reply to hand and Kvanvig.N. Tennant - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):107 – 113.

View all 9 references / Add more references