Analogues of knowability

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):481 – 495 (2003)
An interesting recent reply to the Paradox of Knowability is Neil Tennant's proposal: to restrict the anti-realist's knowability thesis to truths the knowing of which is logically consistent. However, this proposal is egregiously ad hoc unless motivated by something other than the wish to save anti-realism from embarrassment. We examine Tennant's argument that his restriction is motivated by parallel considerations in cases that are neutral with respect to debates about realism. We conclude that the cases are not neutral, nor the considerations parallel. The failure of Tennant's argument provides an opportunity to reflect on, among other things, the nature of Moore's paradox, and the role of idealization in doxastic logic.
Keywords knowability  anti-realism  Fitch  paradox  Tennant
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DOI 10.1080/713659757
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A Principled Solution to Fitch's Paradox.Igor Douven - 2004 - Erkenntnis 62 (1):47 - 69.
Knowability and the Capacity to Know.Michael Fara - 2010 - Synthese 173 (1):53 - 73.
Truth and the Enigma of Knowability.Bernhard Weiss - 2007 - Dialectica 61 (4):521–537.

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