Australasian Journal of Philosophy 81 (4):481 – 495 (2003)
AbstractAn interesting recent reply to the Paradox of Knowability is Neil Tennant's proposal: to restrict the anti-realist's knowability thesis to truths the knowing of which is logically consistent. However, this proposal is egregiously ad hoc unless motivated by something other than the wish to save anti-realism from embarrassment. We examine Tennant's argument that his restriction is motivated by parallel considerations in cases that are neutral with respect to debates about realism. We conclude that the cases are not neutral, nor the considerations parallel. The failure of Tennant's argument provides an opportunity to reflect on, among other things, the nature of Moore's paradox, and the role of idealization in doxastic logic.
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Citations of this work
Some remarks on restricting the knowability principle.Martin Fischer - 2013 - Synthese 190 (1):63-88.
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References found in this work
A logical analysis of some value concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
Clues to the paradoxes of knowability: Reply to Dummett and Tennant.Berit Brogaard & Joe Salerno - 2002 - Analysis 62 (2):143–150.
Is every truth knowable? Reply to hand and Kvanvig.N. Tennant - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (1):107 – 113.