Brian Loar on singular terms

Philosophical Studies 37 (3):271 - 280 (1980)
Abstract
In "the semantics of singular terms," brian loar described and criticized a "causal" theory of reference and offered a new "description" theory. It is argued that the particular causal theory described is not to be found in the papers by donnellan and kripke cited as evidence for it, And is a straw man. Further "prima facie", Loar's new description theory fails to meet kripke's noncircularity condition. Should loar attempt to meet it, His theory is likely to run foul of kripke's usual "arguments from ignorance and error" against description theories
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DOI 10.1007/BF00372448
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Name-Bearing, Reference, and Circularity.Aidan Gray - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):207-231.
What's in a Name.Kent Bach - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (4):371 – 386.
Against Direct Reference.Michael Devitt - 1989 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 14 (1):206-240.
Thoughts and Their Ascription.Michael Devitt - 1984 - Midwest Studies in Philosophy 9 (1):385-420.
Critical Notice.Michael Devitt - 1981 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 59 (2):211 – 221.

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