SATS 21 (1):21-38 (2020)

Authors
Tanya de Villiers-Botha
University of Stellenbosch
Abstract
In recent attempts to define ‘harm’, the most promising approach has often been thought to be the counterfactual comparative account of harm. Nevertheless, this account faces serious difficulties. Moreover, it has been argued that ‘harm’ cannot be defined without reference to a substantive theory of well-being, which is itself a fraught issue. This has led to the call for the concept to simply be dropped from the moral lexicon altogether. I reject this call, arguing that the non-comparative approach to defining harm has not been sufficiently explored. I then develop such an account that avoids the difficulties faced by comparative accounts whilst not presupposing a substantive theory of well-being. I conclude that this definition renders a concept of harm that can be meaningfully employed in our moral discourse.
Keywords harm  defining harm  non-comparative account  negative prudential value  prudential constitution
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DOI 10.1515/sats-2019-0025
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References found in this work BETA

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Well-Being and Death.Ben Bradley - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Normativity.J. J. Thomson - 2010 - Analysis 70 (4):713-715.

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