Mind and Language 22 (4):427-449 (2007)
AbstractWhat grounds my experience of my body as my own? The body that one experiences is always one’s own, but it does not follow that one always experiences it as one’s own. One might even feel that a body part does not belong to oneself despite feeling sensations in it, like in asomatognosia. The article aims at understanding the link between bodily sensations and the sense of ownership by investigating the role played by the body schema
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References found in this work
The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
The Modularity of Mind: An Essay on Faculty Psychology.Jerry A. Fodor - 1983 - MIT Press.