Authors
Tanya de Villiers-Botha
University of Stellenbosch
Abstract
The concept of “harm” is ubiquitous in moral theorising, and yet remains poorly defined. Bradley suggests that the counterfactual comparative account of harm is the most plausible account currently available, but also argues that it is fatally flawed, since it falters on the omission and pre-emption problems. Hanna attempts to defend the counterfactual comparative account of harm against both problems. In this paper, I argue that Hanna’s defence fails. I also show how his defence highlights the fact that both the omission and the pre-emption problems have the same root cause – the inability of the counterfactual comparative account of harm to allow for our implicit considerations regarding well-being when assessing harm. While its purported neutrality with regard to substantive theories of well-being is one of the reasons that this account is considered to be the most plausible on offer, I will argue that this neutrality is illusory.
Keywords Harm  Counterfactual comparative account  Pre-emption problem  Omission problem  Hanna  well-being
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/02580136.2017.1393246
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

 PhilArchive page | Other versions
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
Principia Ethica.G. E. Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.
Reasons and Persons.Joseph Margolis - 1986 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 47 (2):311-327.
What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 2002 - Mind 111 (442):323-354.

View all 27 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

No citations found.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Harm: Omission, Preemption, Freedom.Nathan Hanna - 2016 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):251-73.
A Defense of the Counterfactual Comparative Account of Harm.Justin Klocksiem - 2012 - American Philosophical Quarterly 49 (4):285 – 300.
A Counterexample to Two Accounts of Harm.Duncan Purves - 2014 - Southwest Philosophy Review 30 (1):243-250.
Plural Harm.Neil Feit - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (2):361-388.
The Preemption Problem.Jens Johansson & Olle Risberg - 2019 - Philosophical Studies 176 (2):351-365.
Reversing the Counterfactual Analysis of Causation.Alex Broadbent - 2007 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 15 (2):169 – 189.
Harm, Benefit, and Non-Identity.Per Algander - 2013 - Dissertation, Uppsala University
Degrees of Influence and the Problem of Pre-Emption.Cei Maslen - 2004 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 82 (4):577 – 594.
A Harm Based Solution to the Non-Identity Problem.Molly Gardner - 2015 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 2:427-444.
A Counterfactual Theory of Prevention and 'Causation' by Omission.Phil Dowe - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2):216 – 226.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2018-03-15

Total views
378 ( #21,027 of 2,426,008 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
72 ( #10,101 of 2,426,008 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes