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Why not LF for false belief reasoning?
Behavioral and Brain Sciences 25 (6):682-683 (2002)
Abstract
We argue that natural language has the right degree of representational richness for false belief reasoning, especially the complements under verbs of communication and belief. Language may indeed be necessary synchronically for cross-modular reasoning, but certain achievements in language seem necessary at least diachronically for explicit reasoning about false beliefs.DOI
10.1017/s0140525x02310124
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