Authors
Joe Dewhurst
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Abstract
ABSTRACT Shagrir and Sprevak explore the apparent necessity of representation for the individuation of digits in computational systems.1 1 I will first offer a response to Sprevak’s argument that does not mention Shagrir’s original formulation, which was more complex. I then extend my initial response to cover Shagrir’s argument, thus demonstrating that it is possible to individuate digits in non-representational computing mechanisms. I also consider the implications that the non-representational individuation of digits would have for the broader theory of computing mechanisms. 1 The Received View: No Computation without Representation 2 Computing Mechanisms and Functional Individuation 3 Against Computational Externalism 4 Implications for the Mechanistic Account
Keywords computation  representation  mechanistic explanation
Categories (categorize this paper)
Reprint years 2016, 2018
DOI 10.1093/bjps/axw018
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 70,307
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Explaining the Brain.Carl F. Craver - 2009 - Oxford University Press.
Mechanisms and Natural Kinds.Carl F. Craver - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):575-594.
Computation Without Representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
Computing Mechanisms.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (4):501-526.

View all 11 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Are There Teleological Functions to Compute?Dimitri Coelho Mollo - 2019 - Philosophy of Science 86 (3):431-452.
Mechanisms, Wide Functions, and Content: Towards a Computational Pluralism.Jonny Lee - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (1):221-244.
Computing Mechanisms Without Proper Functions.Joe Dewhurst - 2018 - Minds and Machines 28 (3):569-588.

View all 28 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Computation, Individuation, and the Received View on Representation.Mark Sprevak - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):260-270.
Computing Mechanisms and Autopoietic Systems.Joe Dewhurst - 2016 - In Vincent Müller (ed.), Computing and Philosophy. Springer Verlag. pp. 17-26.
The Enactive Automaton as a Computing Mechanism.Joe Dewhurst & Mario Villalobos - 2017 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):185-192.
Rejecting the Received View.Joe Dewhurst - 2014 - Proceedings of the 50th Anniversary Convention of the AISB.
Aquinas on the Individuation of Non-Living Substances.Christopher M. Brown - 2001 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:237-254.
Aquinas on the Individuation of Non-Living Substances.Christopher M. Brown - 2001 - Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 75:237-254.
Computation Without Representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
Computation and Intentional Psychology.Murat Aydede - 2000 - Dialogue 39 (2):365-379.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2016-04-11

Total views
86 ( #135,534 of 2,507,721 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #209,449 of 2,507,721 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes