Individuation without Representation

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):103-116 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

ABSTRACT Shagrir and Sprevak explore the apparent necessity of representation for the individuation of digits in computational systems.1 1 I will first offer a response to Sprevak’s argument that does not mention Shagrir’s original formulation, which was more complex. I then extend my initial response to cover Shagrir’s argument, thus demonstrating that it is possible to individuate digits in non-representational computing mechanisms. I also consider the implications that the non-representational individuation of digits would have for the broader theory of computing mechanisms. 1 The Received View: No Computation without Representation 2 Computing Mechanisms and Functional Individuation 3 Against Computational Externalism 4 Implications for the Mechanistic Account

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 99,322

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-04-11

Downloads
115 (#165,337)

6 months
17 (#149,912)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Joe Dewhurst
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

References found in this work

Explaining the Brain.Carl F. Craver - 2007 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press.
Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Mechanisms and natural kinds.Carl F. Craver - 2009 - Philosophical Psychology 22 (5):575-594.
Computation without representation.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 137 (2):205-241.
Computing mechanisms.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (4):501-526.

View all 11 references / Add more references