Abstract

This dissertation considers a neglected variety of self-deception, namely, culpable self-deception. Briefly, culpable self-deception is self-deception for which one is morally responsible. It argues that this aspect of self-deception has been largely overlooked in the contemporary discussion of self-deception and that consequently the major models of self-deceptive belief formation fail to account for our moral responsibility for some cases of self-deceptive belief. It examines a model of self-deceptive belief formation proposed by Annette Barnes, one of the most detailed models currently available, and argues that it fails to meet the conditions for moral responsibility set out by John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza. Since Barnes's model fails to meet these conditions for moral responsibility, it fails to explain culpable self-deception. This dissertation then proposes a model of self-deceptive belief formation based upon Thomas Aquinas's account of the interplay between intellect and will that it contends does account for our moral responsibility for some cases of self-deceptive belief. This model is then applied to two detailed cases of culpable self-deception which demonstrate that it meets John Martin Fischer and Mark Ravizza's conditions for moral responsibility, and consequently offers a plausible explanation of culpable self-deception