The commonsense conception and its relation to scientific theory

Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):17 – 30 (2001)
  Copy   BIBTEX


In this paper I discern two concepts of meaning: meaning O - which is assigned by us on the basis of our commonsense conception in order to constitute our own daily reality - and meaning I, which we assign when we interpret reality scientifically. Authors who contend that the commonsense conception is nothing but a kind of scientific theory, do not see that the two fields of life have their own concept of meaning. Commonsense and science are not separate from each other, however: though both have their own practices, the way we interpret reality scientifically presupposes our commonsense conception.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library


Added to PP

67 (#238,055)

6 months
6 (#504,917)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?