Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):17 – 30 (2001)
In this paper I discern two concepts of meaning: meaning O - which is assigned by us on the basis of our commonsense conception in order to constitute our own daily reality - and meaning I, which we assign when we interpret reality scientifically. Authors who contend that the commonsense conception is nothing but a kind of scientific theory, do not see that the two fields of life have their own concept of meaning. Commonsense and science are not separate from each other, however: though both have their own practices, the way we interpret reality scientifically presupposes our commonsense conception.
|Keywords||meaning commonsense folk psychology|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
References found in this work BETA
Explaining Behavior: Reasons in a World of Causes.Fred Dretske - 1988 - MIT Press.
A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.Paul M. Churchland - 1989 - MIT Press.
Science in Action: How to Follow Scientists and Engineers Through Society.Bruno Latour - 1987 - Harvard University Press.
Revolutions and Reconstructions in the Philosophy of Science.Mary Hesse - 1980 - Harvester Press.
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