The commonsense conception and its relation to scientific theory

Philosophical Explorations 4 (1):17 – 30 (2001)
Abstract
In this paper I discern two concepts of meaning: meaning O - which is assigned by us on the basis of our commonsense conception in order to constitute our own daily reality - and meaning I, which we assign when we interpret reality scientifically. Authors who contend that the commonsense conception is nothing but a kind of scientific theory, do not see that the two fields of life have their own concept of meaning. Commonsense and science are not separate from each other, however: though both have their own practices, the way we interpret reality scientifically presupposes our commonsense conception.
Keywords meaning  commonsense  folk psychology
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DOI 10.1080/13869790108523340
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Essays on Actions and Events.Donald Davidson - 1980 - Oxford University Press.

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