The Enactive Automaton as a Computing Mechanism

Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (3):185-192 (2017)
  Copy   BIBTEX


Varela, Thompson, and Rosch illustrated their original presentation of the enactive theory of cognition with the example of a simple cellular automaton. Their theory was paradigmatically anti-computational, and yet automata similar to the one that they describe have typically been used to illustrate theories of computation, and are usually treated as abstract computational systems. Their use of this example is therefore puzzling, especially as they do not seem to acknowledge the discrepancy. The solution to this tension lies in recognizing a hidden background assumption, shared by both Varela, Thompson, and Rosch and the computational theories of mind which they were responding to. This assumption is that computation requires representation, and that computational states must bear representational content. For Varela, Thompson, and Rosch, representational content is incompatible with cognition, and so from their perspective the automaton that they describe cannot, despite appearances, be computational. However, there now exist several accounts of computation that do not make this assumption, and do not characterize computation in terms of representational content. In light of these recent developments, we will argue that it is quite straightforward to characterize the enactive automaton as a non-representational computing mechanism, one that we do not think they should have any objections to.



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,923

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Computation, individuation, and the received view on representation.Mark Sprevak - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):260-270.
Physical Computation: A Mechanistic Account.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2015 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Maxwell's demon and computation.Richard Laing - 1974 - Philosophy of Science 41 (2):171-178.
Computational models: a modest role for content.Frances Egan - 2010 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):253-259.


Added to PP

32 (#513,753)

6 months
6 (#582,229)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author Profiles

Joe Dewhurst
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München
Mario Villalobos
University of Edinburgh

References found in this work

Individuation without Representation.Joe Dewhurst - 2018 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69 (1):103-116.
Computing mechanisms.Gualtiero Piccinini - 2007 - Philosophy of Science 74 (4):501-526.
Computation and content.Frances Egan - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (2):181-203.
Cellular automata.Francesco Berto & Jacopo Tagliabue - 2012 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

View all 8 references / Add more references