Actors Are Not Like Zombies

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 112 (1pt1):115-122 (2012)
Abstract
Daniel Stoljar has recently argued that comparing the zombie argument against physicalism with another influential argument in philosophy of mind, namely, the actor argument against behaviourism, can help to show why recent objections to the zombie argument fail. In this note I want to argue that the zombie argument and the actor argument have important differences, and, because of that, Stoljar's objections to some recent critiques of the zombie argument are not successful
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DOI 10.1111/j.1467-9264.2012.00328.x
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References found in this work BETA
Naming and Necessity.Saul Kripke - 1981 - Philosophy 56 (217):431-433.
Psychologism and Behaviorism.Ned Block - 1981 - Philosophical Review 90 (1):5-43.
Two Conceivability Arguments Compared.Daniel Stoljar - 2007 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107 (1pt1):27-44.

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