Can Phenomenal Concepts Explain The Epistemic Gap?

Mind 119 (476):933-951 (2010)
Authors
Esa Diaz-Leon
University of Barcelona
Abstract
The inference from conceivability to possibility has been challenged in numerous ways. One of these ways is the so-called phenomenal concept strategy, which has become one of the main strategies against the conceivability argument against physicalism. However, David Chalmers has recently presented a dilemma for the phenomenal concept strategy, and he has argued that no version of the strategy can succeed. In this paper, I examine the dilemma, and I argue that there is a way out of it. I conclude that Chalmers has not posed any serious problem for the phenomenal concept strategy to succeed in blocking the conceivability argument. In doing so, my aim is not only to show that Chalmers’s argument has not refuted the phenomenal concept strategy, but also to clarify what any version of the strategy should achieve in order to be successful
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1093/mind/fzq073
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

Our Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 35,023
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

A Posteriori Physicalism and Introspection.Andreas Elpidorou - 2017 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 98 (1):474-500.
Revelation and Physicalism.Kelly Trogdon - 2017 - Synthese 194 (7):2345-2366.
Physicalism.Justin Tiehen - 2018 - Analysis 78 (3):537-551.
The Cognitive Significance of Phenomenal Knowledge.Bénédicte Veillet - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (11):2955-2974.

View all 9 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Defending the Phenomenal Concept Strategy.E. Diaz-Leon - 2008 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):597 – 610.
In Defense of the Phenomenal Concept Strategy1.Katalin Balog - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (1):1-23.
Thinking about phenomenal concepts.Luca Malatesti - 2011 - Synthesis Philosophica 52 (2):391-402.
The Phenomenal Concept Strategy.Peter Carruthers & Benedicte Veillet - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 9-10):212-236.
Phenomenal Concepts, Color Experience, and Mary's Puzzle.Diana I. Pérez - 2011 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy (3):113-133.
A Defence of the Conditional Analysis of Phenomenal Concepts.Jussi Haukioja - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (1):145 - 151.
Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts.Erhan Demircioglu - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (1):257-277.
Phenomenal Concepts.Pär Sundström - 2011 - Philosophy Compass 6 (4):267-281.
On 'Defending The Phenomenal Concept Strategy'.Huiming Ren - 2010 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):347-351.
Phenomenal Concepts and the Problem of Acquaintance.Paul Livingston - 2013 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 20 (5-6):5 - 6.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2009-01-28

Total downloads
347 ( #11,273 of 2,275,411 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
13 ( #31,099 of 2,275,411 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Monthly downloads

My notes

Sign in to use this feature