Disagreeing over evaluatives: Preference, normative and moral discourse

Manuscrito 38 (2):39-63 (2015)
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Abstract

Why would we argue about taste, norms or morality when we know that these topics are relative to taste preferences, systems of norms or values to which we are committed? Yet, disagreements over these topics are common in our evaluative discourses. I will claim that the motives to discuss rely on our attitudes towards the standard held by the speakers in each domain of discourse, relating different attitudes to different motives –mainly, conviction and correction. These notions of attitudes and motives will allow me to claim that different domains of evaluative discourse have a different distribution of disagreements driven by them.

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References found in this work

Scorekeeping in a language game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (1):339--359.
Scorekeeping in a Language Game.David Lewis - 1979 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 8 (3):339.
Relativism and disagreement.John MacFarlane - 2007 - Philosophical Studies 132 (1):17-31.
Making sense of relative truth.John MacFarlane - 2005 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 105 (3):321–339.

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