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The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy
Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):62-73 (2020)
Abstract
The hard problem of consciousness is about how we could explain in physicalist terms why we are conscious. The meta-problem of consciousness is about how we could explain why we have a hard problem of consciousness. In this note I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy can in principle provide a satisfactory solution to the meta-problem.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Marcelino Botin - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):1829-1848.
How Can We Solve the Meta-Problem of Consciousness?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):201-226.
A posteriori Russellian physicalism: a new solution to the meta-problem of consciousness.Marcelino Botin - forthcoming - Philosophical Quarterly.
Phenomenal Concepts as Complex Demonstratives.Nathan Robert Howard & N. G. Laskowski - 2021 - Res Philosophica 98 (3):499-508.
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