The Meta-Problem of Consciousness and the Phenomenal Concept Strategy

Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):62-73 (2020)
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Abstract

The hard problem of consciousness is about how we could explain in physicalist terms why we are conscious. The meta-problem of consciousness is about how we could explain why we have a hard problem of consciousness. In this note I argue that the phenomenal concept strategy can in principle provide a satisfactory solution to the meta-problem.

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Esa Diaz-Leon
Universitat de Barcelona

Citations of this work

How Can We Solve the Meta-Problem of Consciousness?David Chalmers - 2020 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 27 (5-6):201-226.
Russellian Physicalists get our phenomenal concepts wrong.Marcelino Botin - 2023 - Philosophical Studies 180 (7):1829-1848.

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