Topics in Cognitive Science 12 (4):1200-1204 (2020)

Authors
Marcello Di Bello
Arizona State University
Abstract
I comment on two analyses of the Simonshaven case: one by Prakken (2019), based on arguments, and the other by van Koppen and Mackor (2019), based on scenarios (or stories, narratives). I argue that both analyses lack a clear account of proof beyond a reasonable doubt because they lack a clear account of the notion of plausibility. To illustrate this point, I focus on the defense argument during the appeal trial and show that both analyses face difficulties in modeling key features of this argument.
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DOI 10.1111/tops.12451
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A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence.B. Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):194-199.
Probability and the Explanatory Virtues: Figure 1.Clark Glymour - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (3):591-604.

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