Ethics 130 (2):147-178 (2020)

Authors
Collin O'Neil
Lehman College (CUNY)
Marcello Di Bello
Arizona State University
Abstract
Many oppose the use of profile evidence against defendants at trial, even when the statistical correlations are reliable and the jury is free from prejudice. The literature has struggled to justify this opposition. We argue that admitting profile evidence is objectionable because it violates what we call “equal protection”—that is, a right of innocent defendants not to be exposed to higher ex ante risks of mistaken conviction compared to other innocent defendants facing similar charges. We also show why admitting other forms of evidence, such as eyewitness, trace, and motive evidence, does not violate equal protection.
Keywords Profile evidence  Correlations  Statistics  Risk  Conviction  Fairness
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Reprint years 2020
DOI 10.1086/705764
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References found in this work BETA

Failing to Treat Persons as Individuals.Erin Beeghly - 2018 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 5.

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Citations of this work BETA

Recent Work on the Proof Paradox.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophy Compass 15 (6).
Legal proof and statistical conjunctions.Lewis D. Ross - 2020 - Philosophical Studies 178 (6):2021-2041.

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