Oxford University Press (2015)
Authors |
|
Abstract |
Imogen Dickie develops an account of aboutness-fixing for thoughts about ordinary objects, and of reference-fixing for the singular terms we use to express them. Extant discussions of this topic tread a weary path through descriptivist proposals, causalist alternatives, and attempts to combine the most attractive elements of each. The account developed here is a new beginning. It starts with two basic principles, the first of which connects aboutness and truth, and the second of which connects truth and justification. These principles combine to yield a third principle connecting aboutness and justification. Dickie uses the principle to explain how the relations to objects that enable us to think about them--perceptual attention; understanding of proper names; grasp of descriptions--do their aboutness-fixing and thought-enabling work. The book includes discussions of the nature of singular thought and the relation between thought and consciousness.
|
Keywords | reference aboutness demonstratives proper names singular thought descriptive names empty names |
Categories | (categorize this paper) |
Reprint years | 2018 |
Buy this book | $31.99 new Amazon page |
ISBN(s) | 9780198801795 0198801793 9780198755616 0198755619 |
Options |
![]() ![]() ![]() ![]() |
Download options
References found in this work BETA
Citations of this work BETA
The Motivational Structure of Appreciation.Servaas van der Berg - 2019 - Philosophical Quarterly 69 (276):445-466.
View all 51 citations / Add more citations
Similar books and articles
How Proper Names Refer.Imogen Dickie - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (1pt1):43-78.
Fixing the Reference of Theoretical Terms.Robert Nola - 1980 - Philosophy of Science 47 (4):505-531.
Introducing Events, Successful Reference and Reference-Fixing.Friedel Weinert - 1991 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 22 (1):155-167.
The Nameability of Possible Objects.Alberto Voltolini - 1994 - From a Logical Point of View 3:14-33.
Reference Failure and Scientific Realism: A Response to the Meta-Induction.D. Cummiskey - 1992 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 43 (1):21-40.
Object Files, Properties, and Perceptual Content.Santiago Echeverri - 2016 - Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (2):283-307.
Theoretical Terms Without Analytic Truths.Michael Strevens - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 160 (1):167-190.
Two Types of Object Representations in the Brain, One Nondescriptive Process of Reference Fixing.Athanassios Raftopoulos - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (1):47-48.
Match-Fixing: Working Towards an Ethical Framework.Andy Harvey - 2015 - Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 42 (3):393-407.
Communicating Content.Alexandros Tillas & James Trafford - 2015 - Language and Communication 40:1-13.
Reference Fixing and the Stiffness of Reference or Three (Would Be) Puzzles Concerning Names.Ernesto Napoli - 2011 - Rivista di Estetica 47:179-195.
How Perception Fixes Reference.Kevin Mulligan - 1997 - In Alex Burri (ed.), Language and Thought. Hawthorne: De Gruyter. pp. 122-138.
Analytics
Added to PP index
2015-10-14
Total views
14 ( #735,088 of 2,518,720 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #71,985 of 2,518,720 )
2015-10-14
Total views
14 ( #735,088 of 2,518,720 )
Recent downloads (6 months)
10 ( #71,985 of 2,518,720 )
How can I increase my downloads?
Downloads