Is there really no projection postulate in the modal interpretation?

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46 (2):197-218 (1995)
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Abstract

Modal interpretations of quantum mechanics admit two kinds of state: physical states, which specify the values of observables on a system, and theoretical states, which specify a probability distribution over possible physical states. They appear to use this distinction to deny the projection postulate, claiming that collapse corresponds only to a change from discussing the theoretical state to discussing the physical state. I argue that modal interpretations should adopt a projection postulate at the level of the theoretical state. However, other features of modal interpretations might render the projection postulate immune from the usual objections.

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Citations of this work

Modal interpretations, decoherence and measurements.Guido Bacciagaluppi & Meir Hemmo - 1996 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 27 (3):239-277.
Whither the Minds?Jeremy Butterfield - 1996 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 47 (2):200-221.

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References found in this work

Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The Problem of Hidden Variables in Quantum Mechanics.Simon Kochen & E. P. Specker - 1967 - Journal of Mathematics and Mechanics 17:59--87.
Theories of actuality.Robert Merrihew Adams - 1974 - Noûs 8 (3):211-231.

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