Reasons, causes, and contrasts

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 88 (1):1–23 (2007)
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Abstract

The standard argument for the causal theory of action is "Davidson's Challenge": explain the connection between reasons and actions without appealing to the idea that reasons cause actions. I argue that this is an argument to the best contrastive explanation. After examining the nature of contrastive explanation in detail, I show that the causalist does not yet have the best explanation. The best explanation would appeal further to the motivational strength of reasons. Finally, I show how this undermines the argument for causalism, since noncausalists, too, can meet Davidson's Challenge by appealing to motivational strength to explain the cases at issue.

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Citations of this work

Reasons for Action.Pamela Hieronymi - 2011 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 111 (3pt3):407-427.
Wohin führt die kausale Handlungstheorie?Georg Gasser - 2008 - In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Was sind menschliche Personen? Ein akttheoretischer Zugang. Heusenstamm: Ontos Verlag. pp. 181-208.
Why do we need the notion of will?Rafael Graebin Vogelmann - 2020 - Kriterion: Journal of Philosophy 61 (146):523-544.
Right and Wrong Reasons in Folk‐Psychological Explanation.George Botterill - 2009 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 17 (4):463 – 488.

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References found in this work

Motivation and agency.Alfred R. Mele - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Inference to the Best explanation.Peter Lipton - 2004 - In Martin Curd & Stathis Psillos (eds.), The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Science. Routledge. pp. 193.
Anomalous monism and the problem of explanatory force.Louise Antony - 1989 - Philosophical Review 98 (April):153-87.

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