A Reason-Based Theory of Rational Choice
Noûs 47 (1):104-134 (2013)
Abstract |
There is a surprising disconnect between formal rational choice theory and philosophical work on reasons. The one is silent on the role of reasons in rational choices, the other rarely engages with the formal models of decision problems used by social scientists. To bridge this gap, we propose a new, reason-based theory of rational choice. At its core is an account of preference formation, according to which an agent’s preferences are determined by his or her motivating reasons, together with a ‘weighing relation’ between different combinations of reasons. By explaining how someone’s preferences may vary with changes in his or her motivating reasons, our theory illuminates the relationship between deliberation about reasons and rational choices. Although primarily positive, the theory can also help us think about how those preferences and choices ought to respond to normative reasons
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DOI | 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2011.00840.x |
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Where Do Preferences Come From?Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - International Journal of Game Theory 42 (3):613-637.
Reasons, Values, and Rational Actions.Paul K. Moser - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:127-151.
Reasons for (Prior) Belief in Bayesian Epistemology.Franz Dietrich & Christian List - 2013 - Synthese 190 (5):781-786.
Consequentialism and Rational Choice: Lessons From the Allais Paradox.Bruno Verbeek - 2008 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 89 (1):86–116.
Prudence and the Reasons of Rational Persons.Duncan MacIntosh - 2001 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (3):346 – 365.
Prudence and the Temporal Structure of Practical Reasons.Duncan MacIntosh - 2003 - In Sarah Stroud & Christine Tappolet (eds.), Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality. Oxford University Press. pp. 230--250.
A Preference for Selfish Preferences: The Problem of Motivations in Rational Choice Political Science.Ignacio Sánchez-Cuenca - 2008 - Philosophy of the Social Sciences 38 (3):361-378.
Living with Reason.Ross Poole - 1992 - Inquiry : An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 35 (2):199 – 217.
The Promise and Limitations of Rational Choice Theory.Stanley Kelley - 1995 - Critical Review 9 (1-2):95-106.
Can Virtuous Actions Be Both Habitual and Rational?Bill Pollard - 2003 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 6 (4):411-425.
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2009-07-01
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300 ( #12,344 of 2,226,402 )
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59 ( #5,127 of 2,226,402 )
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