Social Choice and Welfare 29 (1):19-33 (2007)

Authors
Franz Dietrich
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Christian List
London School of Economics
Abstract
In response to recent work on the aggregation of individual judgments on logically connected propositions into collective judgments, it is often asked whether judgment aggregation is a special case of Arrowian preference aggregation. We argue for the converse claim. After proving two impossibility theorems on judgment aggregation (using "systematicity" and "independence" conditions, respectively), we construct an embedding of preference aggregation into judgment aggregation and prove Arrow’s theorem (stated for strict preferences) as a corollary of our second result. Although we thereby provide a new proof of Arrow’s theorem, our main aim is to identify the analogue of Arrow’s theorem in judgment aggregation, to clarify the relation between judgment and preference aggregation, and to illustrate the generality of the judgment aggregation model. JEL Classi…cation: D70, D71..
Keywords Judgment aggregation  Preference aggregation  Arrow's impossibility theorem  Condorcet's paradox  Relationship between judgment aggregation and preference aggregation
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Deliberative Democracy and the Discursive Dilemma.Philip Pettit - 2001 - Philosophical Issues 11 (1):268-299.
Logical Constraints on Judgement Aggregation.Marc Pauly & Martin van Hees - 2006 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 35 (6):569 - 585.

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Citations of this work BETA

Judgment Aggregation: A Survey.Christian List & Clemens Puppe - 2009 - In Christian List & Clemens Puppe (eds.), Handbook of Rational and Social Choice. Oxford University Press.

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