Theoria 9 (2):193-202 (1994)

In this note I discuss some topics recently analysed by C.U. Moulines in Pluralidad y recursión showing the interest of Frege’s ontosemantic theory for the study of scientific theories. I point out some misunderstandings in making use of fregean view by clarifying the basic notions of objectivity, sense, reference, concept, and object. It is not my aim here to solve the difficulties arising the possibility of identifying two theories as one. Nevertheless, I ofter some clues to achieve such an identity theory that stricto sensu would be an equivalence theory
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DOI theoria1994928
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