On coherent sets and the transmission of confirmation

Philosophy of Science 72 (3):403-424 (2004)

Authors
Franz Dietrich
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Luca Moretti
University of Aberdeen
Abstract
In this paper, we identify a new and mathematically well-defined sense in which the coherence of a set of hypotheses can be truth-conducive. Our focus is not, as usually, on the probability but on the confirmation of a coherent set and its members. We show that, if evidence confirms a hypothesis, confirmation is "transmitted" to any hypotheses that are sufficiently coherent with the former hypothesis, according to some appropriate probabilistic coherence measure such as Olsson’s or Fitelson’s measure. Our findings have implications for scientific methodology, as they provide a formal rationale for the method of indirect confirmation and the method of confirming theories by confirming their parts.
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Reprint years 2005
DOI 10.1086/498471
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References found in this work BETA

Bayesian Epistemology.Luc Bovens & Stephan Hartmann - 2003 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
What is the Problem of Coherence and Truth?Erik J. Olsson - 2002 - Journal of Philosophy 99 (5):246-272.
Is Coherence Truth Conducive?Tomoji Shogenji - 1999 - Analysis 59 (4):338–345.
A Probabilistic Theory of Coherence.Branden Fitelson - 2003 - Analysis 63 (3):194–199.

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Citations of this work BETA

A Weaker Condition for Transitivity in Probabilistic Support.William A. Roche - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (1):111-118.

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